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 This paper is simply modeled basing on a game between official and public 
for social welfare. From model we compared the advantage and disadvantage 
between administrative accountability and representative accountability to show 
the social significance of representative accountability. Our model described 
how can public harness official's motive to account them. We showed there are 
two advantages from accountability: one is accountability allows the public to 
screen and discipline their officials to make them play a congruent choice with public, 
because it is often difficult to screen official's post action, so that's 
moral-hazard-correcting effect of accountability. The other is public can judge 
official's preference through accountability and thus can weed out 
unaccountable officials that's the correction of adverse selection. On the other 
hand, accountability also has two potential disadvantage: either it may induce 
those officials to pander to public opinion and put too little weight on majority 
welfare but not the optimal choice to social, it’s a contradict to the initial decision 
from public choose them for they were more specialize than public to make choice. Or 
the ability to account from official though public may give them too much power to 
shape government. Through our comparative that representative accountability is 
more adoptive to modern political, and it is very important for public to get 
feedback of policy to warn official more effective. 
As a legacy of representative democracy, accountability is a great leap to 
democracy. Many foreign design of accountability usually emphasize on the 
official's responsible. Although our country is different from others, that are not 
appropriate to copy their mode， and democracy political is a necessary way to 
pass, so it's significant to construct a "from bottom to top" representative 
accountability system. More public joining political either can regulate 
government's preference or improved government's credibility greatly. Our 
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将道德风险和逆向选择结合起来考虑的 早的模型是 Laffont 和 Tirole（1986），
他们考察了用观察成本的方式来规制垄断者的问题。关于问责制导致公众占据主














































































不同的社会收益，但是公众在第 2 期前对官员的第 1 期行为是否是社会 优的毫
不知情，所以只能依据官员的行为是否与大部分公众的偏好一致作为问责标准。
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